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For a variety of dierent industrial sectors and across a range of dierent countries in
sub-Saharan Africa, there is clear evidence that labour-intensive techniques generate
not only substantially more employment than their capital-intensive alternatives, but
more value-added as well.
1 There is just as much evidence, on the other hand that
governments in the region tend to favour the latter over the former in those same
sectors.
2 This apparent loss in output and employment was particularly important in
the 1970s and early 1980s when the state occupied so dominant a position in the
manufacturing sector of most African countries. Our purpose in this paper, however,
is to suggest that the technological behaviour over the period in question was not as
irrational as it is often depicted, because as we see it, the existing literature tends to
ignore a crucial `third dimension' of the choice between capital and labour-intensive
techniques that then confronted decision-makers in the public sector. And although
the bulk of the paper is addressed to the historical period of dominance by the state-
owned sector, we shall nevertheless also suggest that the issues in question remain
relevant in the 1990s, in spite of the many reforms that most African countries sub-
sequently underwent in connection, largely, with the process of structural adjustment.
Ourdiscussion will be cast mainlyin terms of Hirschman's concepts of `trait-taking'
and `trait-making', because they re¯ect so keenly the issues on which the choice of
technology in the public sector actually turn. `Trait-taking' refers to a decision to
acceptsometraits ofatechnology(orproject)as`temporarily unchangeable aspects of
the environment', whereas `trait-making' refers to a decision to change existing traits
of a technology (or project). In these terms, what we shall argue below is that:
(i) labour-intensive techniques often demand more trait-making, in terms of
organizational and entrepreneurial capabilities, than is usually thought neces-
sary, because in practice the choice is not between a single large-scale, capital-
intensive plant and a single labour-intensive alternative, but rather between the
former and a large number of small-scale plants;
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1 See for example the studies reported in Pack (1982) and more recently the work of Bagachwa (1992) on
Tanzania and Ahiakpor (1986) on Ghana.
2 This literature is reviewed most recently by James (1995).(ii) large-scale capital-intensive techniques also require trait making (in the form of
skilled workers, managers and so on), but these techniques, for various reasons,
lend themselves far more readily to trait-taking than is the case with small-scale
alternatives;
(iii) in combination these hypotheses suggest that public sector decision-makers will
incline towards capital, rather than labour-intensive techniques, though in the
latter part of the paper we do describe a case in the public sector of one
particular African country where the opposite choice was made. This case, too,
we believe, can usefully be explained in terms of the concepts of trait-taking and
trait-making.
THE NEGLECTED THIRD DIMENSION
The literature already referred to is generally conducted in a two-factor world where
the only dimensions of technical choice are capital and labour. In thistextbook world,
there are a number of reasons why public-sector decision-makers may not select the
labour-intensive method of production even when it is more ecient (at market and
shadow prices) than the relatively capital-intensive alternative. It is often argued, for
example, that managers of public enterprises have objectives that con¯ict with
economic eciency or that engineers have a professional bias in favour of modern
technology for its own sake.
3 It is not our contention that arguments such as these are
incorrect; on the contrary, they have considerably enhanced our understanding of
technological behaviour in the public sector. Our point is rather that there are
additional dimensions to the problem that simply cannot be captured in this two-
dimensional framework.
These additional dimensions begin to emerge once one considers the way in which
decisions are actually made with regard to the choice of technology in sub-Saharan
Africa. For whereas the existing literature usually pertains to the choice between an
equivalent number of plants with varying factor intensities, planners in that region
typically face a very dierent choice. Underlying the actual process is the selection,
initially, of an incremental amount of output and it is the determinants of this
planned amount that ®rst need to be understood. In particular, what most funda-
mentally needs to be recognized is that there are a number of reasons why the planned
level of additional output is invariably at least as high as the capacity of a single
relatively large-scale and capital-intensive factory.
One reason is political and has to do with meeting national excess demand for key
wage goods as rapidly as possible. Barclay, for example, has referred to `Kenya's
commitment to meeting the consumer demand for sugar by attaining self-suciency
in its production' (1977, p.62). `Satisfaction of consumer demand', he argues, `has
remained a high political priority for the government'. Another reason isthat planned
increases in industrial output are often based on feasibility studies and sector reports
conducted by external consultants who have a vested interest in the sale of large-scale
imported machinery. In Tanzania, for example, what [the sectoral textile company]
Texco did was `in eect to entirely hand over its sectoral planning responsibilities ...
to aforeign consulting organization ... the Gherzi Textile Organization of Zurich was
commissioned to examine the whole industry. Its report was accepted in its entirety
3 The former is discussed by Niskanen (1973) and the latter by Wells (1975).
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incorporated lock, stock and barrel into the national plan ... The report in fact
suggested a massive expansion programme' (O'Brien, 1983, p.171). Similarly, in the
Ivory Coast, Mytelka has observed how `feasibility studies for the sugar complexes
were prepared by their expatriate promoters, based on exaggerated expectations of ...
both domestic and world sugarconsumption' (Mytelka, 1992, p.249). Finally, there is
the in¯uence exerted by Hyden's argument that `African leaders have wanted to make
historical shortcuts' (Hyden, 1983, p.123). Such leaders, that is to say, have sought to
replace conventional stages of development with deliberate and rapid structural
changes in the economy. Hyden aptly refers to this style of development as `running
while others walk'.
In combination, the three in¯uences mentioned in the previous paragraph have
often given rise to increases in planned capacity that were large relative to pre-existing
levels. Table 1, for example, shows the increases in capacity for a selected group of
manufacturing industries in Tanzania between 1976 and 1980.
The reason why examples such as these are important for our purposes arises in
conjunction with the fact that capital and labour-intensive techniques are not usually
associated with the same number of plants in the production of a given level of
output. On the contrary, as shown in Table 2 for a selected sample of industrial
sectors, a single capital-intensive plant requires a larger, and in some cases a much
larger number of labour-intensive plants to produce the same level of output.
For the point is then that as long as the planned increase in output is equal to at
least the capacity of a single large-scale plant, further dimensions enter into the choice
of techniques in addition to just the two traditional factors, capital and labour. In
particular, not only will more entrepreneurs be needed to run the additional labour-
intensive units of production, but those additional units will themselves impose
organizational demands on the public sector.
4 And it so happens that in much of sub-
Saharan Africa both entrepreneurs and organizational capabilities in the public
sector are in particularly short supply. In relation to Tanzania, for example, Clark has
argued that `capital is not the most scarce resource. Rather, both entrepreneurs,
people with the ability to initiate projects, and managers, people with the ability to
operate them, are in short supply'
5 (Clark, 1978, p.212).
Table 1. Capacity in Tanzanian Manufacturing, 1976 and 1980.
Source: ILO (1982, p.219).
1976 1980
Textiles (million sq mt) 90 200
Cement ('000 Mt) 340 1,100
Shoes (million pairs) 6.0 14.0
Leather (million sq ft) 11.8 32.5
Sugar ('000 Mt) 115 195
Containers (millions) 63.5 196
Hoes/ploughs ('000 Mt) 1.2 3.0
4 In Pack's (1982) study of the macroeconomic eects of switching from capital to labour-intensive
methods of production this problem is simply assumed away i.e. he assumes `that the supply of managers
and operatives is sucient to enable a large number of smaller plants to be established simultaneously'
(Pack, 1982, p.6).
5 Clark (1978) emphasizes that the problem may not exist or be less severe in other regions, such as India.
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advanced, by comparing the situation where labour-intensive techniques demand the
making of certain traits, with the way in which this dimension of such technology is
usually neglected in the literature (based as it is on only two dimensions).
TRAIT-TAKING VERSUS TRAIT-MAKING IN THE CHOICE
OF TECHNOLOGY
So far we have focused on certain important, but neglected technological capabilities
that would be associated with the choice of labour, over capital-intensive methods of
production. But it is also true of course that the latter are themselves demanding of
technological capabilities (albeit of a dierent kind) that are just as scarce in the
African context. Indeed, it is precisely these demands (for managers, skilled workers,
engineers, etc.) that have long led numerous economists to question the appropriate-
ness of such techniques not only to sub-Saharan Africa but also to developing
countries more generally. What distinguishes capital, from labour-intensive tech-
niques in this regard, however, is that the former lend themselves far more easily in
actual practice to what Hirschman (1967) describes as `trait-taking'. By this he means
a decision to accept the short-run impossibility of generating the necessary
capabilities locally and importing them from abroad instead. He contrasts this type
of behaviour with `trait-making', which entails an explicit decision to change existing,
or create entirely new traits. (The relative ease of trait-taking by importing in the case
of capital-intensive techniques is due, in part, to the far more numerous possibilities
Table 2. Number of labour-intensive plants to produce
output equivalent of one capital-intensive plant. (Sources:
Kaplinsky (1990), Green (1978), Kaplinsky (1987), Bagachwa
(1992), Roemer et al. (1976), respectively.)
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aid and suppliers' credits.)
As re¯ected perhaps most clearly in the popularity of large-scale turnkey projects in
manufacturing,
6 it is fair to say that with few exceptions planners in sub-Saharan
Africa have opted for a combination of capital-intensive techniques and trait-taking
(via importation of the necessary capabilities), over the combination of labour-
intensive methods and trait-making (where the traits to be made are the scarce
organizational and entrepreneurial capabilities referred to earlier). In Co Ã te d'Ivoire,
for example, a study of the cement industry ®nanced by UNIDO recommended the
production of cement block which `is less import intensive than cement, uses large
quantities of cheap laterite clay, can be produced in small decentralised units thereby
decreasing the cost of building materials and of investment costs at the same time as it
increases employment'. However, `The scarcityof public funds and the lackof artisans
to sta these small enterprises seriously constrain the government's ability to implement
this programme' (Mytelka, 1992, p.262, emphasis added). Similarly, in the case of
Tanzania, the problem with producing sugar on the basis of small-scale (open-pan
sulphitation) plants was that some 200 such plants would have been required to
replace the output of ®ve large-scale ones. The managerial and supervisory problems
associated with the former, as well as the training of operatives in the OPS method
and the diculties of raising ®nance for small-scale, labour-intensive techniques
all strongly mitigated against its use (James, 1987). That the combination of
capital-intensive techniques and trait-taking should enjoy such popularity is thus not
dicult to explain. After all, in this as in other contexts, trait-taking has an obvious
appeal, oering as it does the prospect of a reduction in the various uncertainties that
attend the construction and operation of development projects. Trait-making on the
other hand, suers by de®nition from the absence of these advantages and is subject
instead to considerable doubt and uncertainty regarding the course of development
projects.
Consider, for example, how these considerations bore on the choice of an
automated bakery in Tanzania, which, to many observers at the time seemed like
highly inappropriate technology in comparison with the alternative hand-baking
technology. For, not only did the latter save on the cost of capital but it also reduced
import costs in comparison with the former. And since the spare parts and replace-
ment machines associated with hand bakeries could have been locally produced, this
technology could also have helped to promote the local capital goods sector. The
problem, however, (orat least a major part of the problem) wasthat the hand bakeries
would have required a substantial amount of trait-making. That is:
in the absence of a pool of hand baking expertise and of successful producer
cooperative experience generalizeable to new ventures getting 40/50Ðas
opposed to 2 to 4Ðbakeries running with a minimum degree of eectiveness
even over 3 to 4 years would have involved training and support of a type which
Tanzania was quite incompetent to provide (Green, 1978, p.18).
The large-scale, automated bakery, on the other hand was ®nanced by Canadian
aid and the turnkey arrangement with which the project was associated allowed the
missing local traits, or capabilities, to be `taken', via imports, rather than requiring
6 For the case of Tanzania, Wangwe (1986) found that most turnkey projects occurred in the public sector.
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cases in sub-Saharan Africa, is that trait-taking by importing becomes `trait-
reinforcing' (to use Hirschman's term). That is to say:
the local people whose inability to perform certain tasks is taken for granted and
as unchangeable may come to be systematically excluded ... from the skilled
positions and occupations by the newcomers who will acquire an interest in
being retained as `indispensable' in the elite positions they have come to occupy.
Similarly, imports of needed material inputs may discourage or destroy any
incipient local production. These are familiar mechanisms, well described by the
concepts `cumulative sequence' and `self ful®lling prophecy' (Hirschman, 1967,
p.132).
That imports of large-scale, capital-intensive technologies by state-owned (and
other) enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa have been associated with this tendency to
stunt rather than promote domestic technological capabilities (the traits in extremely
short supply), is a popular refrain among industrial economists. In the case of the
Ivory Coast, for example, Mytelka concludes that the reliance by the public sector on
foreign capital and suppliers has `had little impact on the building of indigenous
technological capabilities through the technology transfer process' (Mytelka, 1985,
p.87). Similarly, of Tanzania it has been said that:
In the process of implementing turnkey projects the local manpower is `freed'
from participating in those preparatory and investment decision activities which
have considerable learning eects ... This way the opportunity to increase the
supply of managerial and technical skills through learning-by-doing is foregone
(Wangwe, 1986, p.15).
Observations such as these have given rise to numerous suggestions as to how
imports of modern technology can be made more compatible with trait-making
behaviour (that is, with the acquisition of indigenous technological capabilities).
7
What has received much less attention, however, is the process of trait-making in the
(large-scale) application of labour-intensive techniques in sub-Saharan Africa, a
process, that, as noted previously, has to do with organizational and entrepreneurial
capabilities. In what follows we discuss these issues with particular reference to the
Rural Access Roads Programme in Kenya, where labour-intensive technology was
successfully applied on a large scale in the public sector.
TRAIT-MAKING FOR LABOUR-INTENSIVE TECHNOLOGY
Hirschmanian Latitudes
As already noted, trait-making behaviour in general runs the risk that the traits which
are lacking and on which the success of the project depends, will not in fact be `made'.
`Under what conditions' then, asks Hirschman (1967, p.135), `is the risk suciently
7 See for example Stewart et al. (1992). There is also a more general literature on `unpackaging' imported
technology. See for example Stewart (1979).
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be believes,
is that many traits, from simple skills to administrative ability, can be slowly
learned `on the job' or alongside it. The fact that these traits are not yet available
in the desired quantity and quality at the inception of the project can mean
simply that the cost of construction and operation of the project should make
allowance for the inevitable learning process to which outside education and
training will of course be expected to make an important contribution. It is
precisely because much trait-taking proceeds through gradual `on the job'
learning that latitude for poor performance can be a welcome attribute of
projects (Hirschman, 1967, p.135).
Performance latitudes may take at least two forms: one having to do with time and
the other having to do with product quality. Temporal latitudes make speci®c
allowance for the extra time that is needed for traits to be made during the course of
development projects, whose average duration will thus tend to be longer than similar
projects engaged in trait-taking technological behaviour. Product quality latitudes
recognize not only that the period during which traits are being made may entail
temporary problems in attaining high standards, but also that labour-intensive
techniques are often themselves incapable of producing precisely the same product
characteristics as capital-intensive technology (among other reasons, because of the
greater degree of engineering precision that the latter is able to achieve).
Both types of performance latitude, we should note, played a role in what is to date
perhaps the most important application of labour-intensive techniques on a large
scale in sub-Saharan Africa, namely the Rural Access Roads Programme in Kenya
(which has built thousands of kilometres of access, and more recently minor roads, on
the basis of labour-intensive methods of construction).
8 Consider ®rst the temporal
latitudes that were granted to this programme in the name of trait-making (that is, on
the basis of an explicitly recognized need to develop the technological capabilities
associated with the use of labour-intensive technology on, what, at the time, was an
unprecedented scale). In particular:
The programme had a very slow build up ... Thus in the ®rst 3 years output was
low. This was a result of a quite deliberate policy decision. It was recognized that
this was a totally new programme for Kenya using a technology which was not
widely understood. Time was therefore required to modify and adapt the existing
procedures and to develop a suitable training programme (Edmonds and Ruud,
1984, p.15).
During this trait-making phase (from 1975 to 1980), the Roads Programme in
Kenya was provided with considerable expatriate support. By 1980, however, after
signi®cant trait-making had indeed taken place among the local labour force, the
foreign presence was `drastically reduced both in quantity and orientation' (Edmonds
and Ruud, 1984, p.16). Evidently, the gradual learning that Hirschman thought
possible when a degree of latitude is present, can be accomplished in sub-Saharan
8 The choice of technique in road construction is similar to the examples cited above from the
manufacturing sector, in that the labour-intensive alternative involves spreading a much larger number of
labourers over a wide terrain, with a consequent need for supervisory and organizational capabilities.
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of the Kenyan experience.)
The Roads Programme also exploited the quality latitudes that are available in the
construction (and maintenance) of access and minor, as distinct from main roads.
Because the former are used much less intensively than the latter, for example, they
permit a greater degree of tolerance in horizontal and geometric design standards.
Access and minor roads, moreover, need to be built with a lesser degree of precision
than major roads and there is correspondingly more scope for labour-intensive
methods in the former than in the latter. In regard to the `compaction of earthworks
and the ®nal surfacing' for example `it is true that it is extremely dicult to provide
the same standard using labour-based methods'
9 (Edmonds and Howe, 1980, p.18).
In many other cases in Kenya, as elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, however, the
scope for quality latitudes is unnecessarily restricted by the use of developed-country
standards. Housing in Kenya, for example, is subject to building codes and standards
that put houses subject to those regulations out of the reach of the low-income
majority. On the other hand, housing constructed to lower standards would not only
make basic shelter aordable to that majority, but it would also permit more labour-
intensive methods of housing construction on a large scale.
Trait-making and Uncertainty
As we have already seen, it is in the very nature of trait-making that the outcome of
the exercise is subject to doubt and uncertainty, a consideration which we further
suggested, helps to explain why policy-makers in sub-Saharan Africa have tended to
favour trait-taking with regard to the capabilities aspects of development projects. If
trait making is to be encouraged, therefore, some means of reducing the attendant
uncertainty needs to be found.
What bears perhaps most emphasis in this regard is the scope for pilot projects to
test the eventual likelihood of successful trait-making on a larger scale. The experi-
ence with the project on a small-scale, experimental basis, that is say, is used to gauge
its probable success at a macro or national level. In this way uncertainty can be
reduced (though of course not entirely eliminated) at relatively low cost. Such an
approach was adopted in the Kenya Rural Roads Programme referred to earlier and
it ought, according to Green (1978), also have been considered as an alternative to the
automated bakery in Tanzania. In particular, he suggeststhat part of an alternative to
the selection of that type of large-scale bakery would have been to `identify and
support a group (or groups) interested in creating one to three test cooperative, small
scale, hand bakeries' and to `experiment with ways of providing procurement and
marketing services to the hand bakery' (Green, 1978, p.19).
Where relevant, moreover, the design of pilot projects itself can bene®t from the
successfulexperienceofsimilarcountrieselsewhereintheregion,thusfurtherreducing
the uncertainties associated with trait-making behaviour. In this regard, the Kenya
Roads Programme is once again illustrative of what can be achieved. I am referring
here to the `study tour' of the Programme that was initiated by the International
9 Product quality latitudes have been exploited in China's rural industrialization policy, as when, for
example, low quality cement is used for dams with earthwork cores (Perkins, 1977).
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economists from other African countries. The participants were given the opportunity
to visit some of the ®eld activities and to discuss the Programme with those ocials
most closely involved with it (van Veen, 1980). Since then, and based partly on that
experience, a number of African countries (such as Botswana and Ethiopia) have
themselves embarked on pilot road construction projects using labour-intensive
methods (Edmonds and Ruud, 1984).
Decentralization within the Public Sector
Because they often tend to be located in dispersed, rural areas, labour-intensive
industrial techniques are most eectively administered through (and indeed may even
necessitate) a decentralized, rather than a centralized public sector. It is unfortunate
from the point of view of the trait-making that is needed with these types of
techniques, that the state in most African countries is run along highly centralized
lines. Indeed, for both internal political reasons as well as a tendency for foreign aid
donors to bypass `secondary structures in favour of relationships with central
authorities' (Picard, 1994, p.8), the African state is highly centralized even by the
standards of the rest of The Third World (Table 3, for example, makes this point clear
in relation to the shares of government employment in total nonagricultural sector
employment by region).
That so extreme a degree of state centralization has hindered the trait-making
needed for the extensive-application of labour-intensive technology, is well-illustrated
by the bakery case in Tanzania, to which we have already alluded on a number of
dierent occasions. For, whereas the large-scale automated bakery in that example
was well-suited to the highly centralized manner in which the state was then organized
in Tanzania, the `real diculty' facing the competing hand bakeries `was that there
was no evident decentralized public sector institution to operate [them]. Prior
experience ... had left both ocials and politicians wary of proposing ``green ®eld''
sectoral developments at the small scale, public sector level' (Green, 1978, p.15).
It is true that since then, in Tanzania as indeed most other countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, eorts have been made, mainly in the context of overall reform programmesto
strengthen local governments. And in some of those countries progress towards
meeting this objective has certainly taken place. As a result of the district focus policy
in Kenya, for example, `the ®nancial management of district speci®c projects now
occurs at the district level, more senior personnel are operating at the district level,
and development committees have signi®cant input at the project identi®cation stage'
(Oyugi, 1994, p.93). Similarly, in Rwanda, `the commune has emerged as an
increasingly important institution for rural mobilization and participation and for the
Table 3. Share of government employment in total nonagricultural sector employment 1983
(in per cent). Source: Heller and Tait (1983).
Africa Asia Latin America
Central government 30.8 13.9 20.7
State and Local government 2.1 8.0 4.2
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1994, p.275). Overall reviews of the African experience, however, suggest that
progress towards a more decentralized state has been rather limited. Garrity and
Picard (1994, p.156) for example, are not alone when they conclude that `Throughout
Africa, policy elites have been less than successful in decentralizing policymaking and
administration ... Both decentralization and pluralism have foundered on lack of
resources (physical and human) a lack of skills, and the lack of political will to
commit to devolved, participatory government.'
To this extent, therefore, decentralization itself still remains very much a scarce trait
and as such is subject to the same problems and opportunities (aorded, for example,
by various types of latitudes) as other traits that still need to be `made' in sub-Saharan
Africa.
IS TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICE IN THE AFRICAN PUBLIC SECTOR
STILL RELEVANT?
One might reasonably wonder whether the issues raised above, which applied mainly
to the circumstances prevailing in the 1970s and early 1980s, are still relevant in the
1990s, after the many attempts to curb the size and power of the public sector in sub-
Saharan Africa. Indeed, there are some observers who seem to regard this sector and
its problems as a non-issue under contemporary circumstances. In our view, however,
this is a seriously mistaken point of view which is simply unsupported by the available
data for most African countries.
In particular, two World Bank Reports published in the mid 1990s clearly indicate
that in a number of African and other developing countries `state-owned enterprises
(SoEs) account for nearly as large a share ... today as twenty years ago. Indeed, ...
the size of the state-owned enterprise sector has signi®cantly diminished only in the
former socialist economies and a few middle-income countries. In most developing
countries, particularly the poorest, bureaucrats run as large a share of the economy as
ever' (World Bank, 1995, p.1). Since much of the historical evidence presented above,
pertained to one speci®c African country, Tanzania, it is especially noteworthy that
between the periods 1978±1985 and 1986±91 in that country, the share of state-owned
enterprises in non-agricultural economic activity actually rose by almost 6 per cent
(World Bank, 1995).
The continued existence of so large a public sector in many African countries has,
to a greater or lesser degree, thwarted the emergence of a more prominent role for the
indigenous private sector, which, also, still often suers from a number of weak-
nesses, not the least of which is a lack of technological capabilities of various kinds.
10
And even such capacities as there are in the private sector are often underestimated by
the prevailing highly centralized systems of government, referred to above.
An example of how capacities of local ®rms are often underestimated by central
government ministries is provided by Burundi and Tanzania, where private
10 There are, of course, some exceptions, one of the most interesting of which is the emergence in Tanzania
and Zimbabwe of a low-cost, labour-intensive technology known as the ram press. With assistance
provided, among other institutions, by Appropriate Technology International, 2,000 new small-scale
privately owned enterprises have been created in these two countries. For further details see Hyman (1993).
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roads even as their respective Highway Authorities were unaware of such
activities and did not know that such private contractors were available with
their own road equipment (Silverman, 1992, p.12).
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have argued that the existing literature on the choice of industrial
technology in sub-Saharan Africa misconstrues the way in which the issue is actually
perceived by decision-makers in the public sector. In particular, this literature fails to
recognize that in practice the choice is frequently between a single large-scale plant
and numerous smaller labour-intensive plants which would be needed to produce a
level of output equivalent to that of a single, large-scale, capital-intensive factory
making a similar type of product.
This recognition is important because the additional labour-intensive units of
production require entrepreneurial and organizational resources that are extremely
scarce in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, yet, which are ignored in the traditional
two-factor description of the choice of technology. If labour-intensive techniques are
to be used on a wider scale, far more attention needs, accordingly, to be paid to the
problem of building up these capabilities than has hitherto been the case. (Expressed
in Hirschmanian terms, the need is for more attention to be paid to the `making' as
opposed to the `taking' of the traits in question.) By drawing on a number of case
studies from sub-Saharan AfricaÐof success as well as of failureÐwe have
described a set of policy measures that might be taken to redress this important
problem. These include taking advantage of performance latitudes associated with
certain projects (where the product duration and product quality variations are not
critical to the outcome); reducing uncertainty by project experimentation on a pilot
basis; decentralization within the public sector and decentralization to the small-scale
private sector.
APPENDIX: TRAIT-MAKING ASSOCIATED WITH
LABOUR-INTENSIVE TECHNOLOGY
The Figure 1 depicts not only the two usual dimensions of technical choice, but also a
third dimension, representing entrepreneurial/organizational capabilities. The latter,
however, is associated with only one of the three capital±labour ratios we have
identi®ed in the diagram. The ®rst two ratios, K1L1 and K3L3, represent, we assume,
the choice between a single large-scale, capital-intensive plant and one smaller-scale,
relatively labour-intensive unit of production respectively. It can be seen that neither
of these methods makes any demands on our third factor input and it is indeed
precisely the choice between these two methods that is implicit in the existing
literature.
The ratio K2L2, on the other hand, does demand entrepreneurial/organizational
capabilities (equal to say OR) because it requires more than a single plant to produce
the higher level of output associated with K1L1 (on the isoquant II rather than the
isoquant ii). This distinction is shown more explicitly in Figure 2 which contains three
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Figure 2. The relationship between factor intensity and number of plants
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808 J. Jamesquadrants rather than three dimensions. The ®rst quadrant contains the same
information about capital±labour ratios as Figure 1but the second quadrant indicates
the number of plants that is associated with each such ratio. And whereas the capital-
intensive and small-scale labour intensive methods, K1L1 and K3L3, are associated (by
previous assumption) with only one plant, the larger-scale labour-intensive technique
K2L2 requires a greater number, equal to say OX. The third quadrant, in turn, displays
the extent of additional costs that are associated with technique K2L2, an amount
which we have arbitrarily assumed in the ®gure to equal OY.
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